False advertising in a crowdfunding market

摘要：

　　As a growing enormously method of financing and selling new products, crowdfunding usually accompanies with the overstating product quality.We consider creators with low product quality in a crowdfunding market may use false advertising to overstate the value of their products and a policy maker can punish such false advertising.We propose a two-period crowdfunding model in which a creator may charge different prices over time to sequentially arriving buyers.Both advertising and prices decisions of creators are discussed in the paper, and we characterize an equilibrium where false advertising interact with crowdfunding pricing dynamics over time.

关键词： false advertising crowdfunding signal game separating equilibrium pooling equilibrium

作者: Juan Zhang Jian Huang Xiabing Zheng

作者单位: Business School, Hohai University, China School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, China School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Eighteenth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business(第18届武汉电子商务国际会议)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 350-357

在线出版日期: 2019-05-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）