Carbon Emission Reduction and Pricing Policies Considering Competition and Consumers Low-carbon Awareness in Cap-and-Trade System
Manufacturer dominating Stackelberg games were proposed for one-manufacturer and two retailers,and two-manufacturers and one-retailer supply chains.The carbon emission reduction and the pricing decisions under the cap-and-trade system were explored.In addition,the supply chain members optimal profits were obtained.The paper analyzed the effects of consumers low-carbon awareness(CLA),carbon trade price,and channel structure on firms optimal decisions and profits.It shows that in both kinds of supply chains,the manufacturers optimal emission reduction per unit of product and the retailers optimal profit increase,while the optimal wholesale and retail prices decrease,as CLA increases.As the carbon trade price increases,the clean manufacturer dominating supply chains optimal emission reduction per unit of product and the retailers optimal profit increase,while the optimal wholesale and retail prices decrease,and subsequently,in the polluting manufacturer dominating supply chain.The supply chain structure significantly affects the impact of CLA on the manufacturers optimal profit.The emission permits allocated by the government and the manufacturers initial emission per unit of product significantly affect the influence of carbon trade price on the manufacturers optimal profit.
cap-and-trade carbon emission reduction low-carbon awareness supply chain management horizontal competition
Liangjie Xia Yongwan Bai Juanjuan Qin Baiyun Yuan
School of Business,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,No.25,Zhujiang Road,Tianjin 300222,Ch Research Center for Energy Economics,School of Business Administration,Henan Polytechnic University,
国际会议
上海
英文
249-269
2017-07-07（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）