Network Defense Strategy Selection Based on Best-response Dynamic Evolutionary Game Model
Since traditional game theory applying to network attack and defense has the restriction of complete rational,we establish non-cooperative evolutionary game model of network attack and defense on the premise of bounded rationality,and solved by the replicator dynamic equations.For the strategy learning evolution process of defender,we use the Best-response dynamic learning mechanism to establish the dynamic evolutionary game model between defenders,which can analyze the dynamic evolution process and defense evolution equilibrium point of defending strategy selection.Then,we summarize the evolution laws of network defense strategy selection under bounded rationality.The validity of the model and method is validated by system simulation.
Network attack and defense Evolutionary game Bounded rationality Replicator dynamic equation Best-response Dynamic Evolution equilibrium point
Jian-ming Huang Jin-dong Wang Heng-wei Zhang Na Wang
Zhengzhou Institute of Information Science and Technology Zhengzhou,China
国际会议
重庆
英文
2611-2615
2017-03-25（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）