Competition between Public and Private Hospitals:The Roles of Private Health Insurance and Government Policies
To address the competition between public hospital and private hospital involving private health insurance(PHI),we establish a mixed duopoly game model within a queue system.Specifically,we consider the competition between a public hospital(he)a private hospital(she)in an elective care market considering two settings: with and without the tax-subsidy policy.Under each setting,we obtain the hospitals optimal decisions under three scenarios: no patient having PHI(as a benchmark),all patients having PHI(Compulsory PHI policy)and part of patients having PHI(Voluntary PHI policy).We examine the effects of PHI and government policies on patients waiting time,patients total welfare,private hospitals profit and social welfare.Our results show that tax-subsidy policy is an effective policy to reduce waiting time and improve total patient welfare while PHI always benefits the private hospital.And,interestingly,the role of PHI on total patient welfare is rather different when part of patients having PHI under the two cases.
Healthcare competition Waiting time Private health insurance Government policy Queue theory
Yanfei Lan Yinliang Zhang Ruiqing Zhao
College of Management & Economics Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072 China
国际会议
河北秦皇岛
英文
131-134
2017-08-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）