On the Competition of On-Demand Service Platforms
In this paper we consider the competition between two on-demand service platforms,which compete for both potential customers and agents.The two platforms have different pricing strategies.We assume one platform has service advantage such that a higher price and a higher wage are offered.Potential customers require immediate service.They estimate the expected waiting time and make decisions on choosing either platform or giving up the immediate service,according to the utility value of ordering the service through the platforms.We assume agents will put the first priority to serve the customers ordering from the higher-wage platform.Via a queueing formulation,we study the customers equilibrium strategies,we investigate the pricing competition game between the two platforms,and we also consider the social welfare optimization decisions.Managerial insights are derived.
On-demand service platforms Strategic queues Price competition
Qingying Li Pengfei Guo Christopher S.Tang
Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,1882 West Yanan Road,Shanghai,P.R Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies,Faculty of Business,The Hong Kong Polytechnic Universit UCLA Anderson School,UCLA,Los Angeles,California 90095,USA
国际会议
河北秦皇岛
英文
157-160
2017-08-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）