The Heterogeneity in Accounting Information and Executive Compensation: Evidence from China

摘要：

　　This paper examines whether the heterogeneity in accounting information should be taken into consideration when formulating managerial incentive contracts, given that the majority of Chinas listed firms base their executive pay on accounting information.The heterogeneity in accounting information, which we define as the significant incongruence of the assessments that vary among the multiple performance indicators, may weaken the roles played by accounting numbers in the setting of the managerial incentive contracts.

关键词： accounting information heterogeneity executive compensation

作者: JIANG Tao XU Yue LIU Yunguo

作者单位: School of accounting, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing,China,400054 School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China,510275

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 9th (2017)International Conference on Financial Risk and Corporate Finance Management(第九届(2017)金融风险与公司金融国际研讨会)

会议地点: 日本

会议语种:英文

页码: 348-353

在线出版日期: 2017-07-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）