Institutional Investor Network,Executive Compensation and Governance Effect

摘要：

　　Taking A-share listed companies in China during 2012-2014 as research objects,empirical results show that: with the increase of network centrality, governance institutions contribute to the executive cash compensation incentive, suppress the pay performance sensitivity to a certain extent, and increase the possibility of the implementation of equity incentive plan.Further examination of the characteristics of property right shows that: there is difference between the executive power and the institutional ownership, and the corporate tends to adopt the financial policy of low risk and high cash dividend.

关键词： institutional investor network centrality executive compensation

作者: Liu Jingjian Ji Danning Yan Yingchun

作者单位: School of Management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China, 116024

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: the 8th (2016)International Conference on Financial Risk and Corporate Finance Management(第八届(2016)金融风险与公司金融国际研讨会)

会议地点: 大连

会议语种:英文

页码: 158-163

在线出版日期: 2016-07-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）