Risk-profit equilibrium of private capital in the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) model of reclamation for coal mine subsidence
The reclamation for coal mine subsidence projects need a lot of capital, with the characteristics of huge investments, long project periods, and hard predicting risks.On the one hand, the government is facing enormous financial pressure.On the other hand, the government investment is inefficient due to the lack of expertise.Therefore, it is necessary to solve the problems using the PPP model to bring in private capital investments.The purpose of private capital investment is to obtain investment income.And earlier research indicated that a fair risk allocation among the stakeholders is essential for the success PPP projects.To improve negotiation efficiency, reduce financing costs, and ensure stakeholders reasonable income level, a bargaining game-shapely model is built to solve the decision making problem of rational allocation of private capital returns based on full study of project risk.The paper provides a theoretical method, which contributes to improve the efficiency of financing negotiations, bring in private capital investment, and speed up the reclamation process.
Coal Mine Subsidence Reclamation PPP Risk Profit Game
F.Li X.J.Li X.Y.Min Z.L.Wu
College of Resources and Environment, Shandong Agricultural University, Taian, Shandong, China;Colle College of Resources and Environment, Shandong Agricultural University, Taian, Shandong, China Jining Land Resources Bureau, Jining, Shandong, China
国际会议
The 2nd International Symposium on Land Reclamation and Ecological Restoration (第二届国际土地复垦与生态修复学术研讨会)
西安
英文
17-19
2017-10-20(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)