Pay-for-Performance (PFP) in the Public Sector:Evidence of Pay Enough or Dont Pay at All

摘要：

　　Evidence shows that pay-for-performance (PFP) practices, especially those individual-based, often fail to motivate public employees partly because of a lack of sizable bonus.However,many government agencies keep adopting it for a few political reasons.Using the US General Social Survey (GSS) data, the present study provides evidence showing that giving a small size of bonus is much worse than giving nothing, in line with the proposition of pay enough or dont pay at all. With the presence of a small size of bonus, public organizations actually achieve political goals at the price of undermining employees perceptions of multi-dimensional quality of working life, including perceived resource availability, perceived social support, perceived higher-level need satisfaction, and confidence in organizations.

关键词： Pay-for-performance Bonus pay Motivation crowding Self-determination theory

作者: CHEN Chung-an

作者单位: Public Policy and Global Affairs Program me,Nanyang Technological University,Singapore,637332

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2015 International Conference on Public Administration (11 th)2015(第十一届)公共管理国际会议

会议地点: 印度尼西亚

会议语种:英文

页码: 450-466

在线出版日期: 2015-12-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）