Empirical Study on the Influence of Negative Media Coverage on Tunneling of Controlling Shareholder
As an important external corporate governance mechanism,negative media coverage has great impacts on restraining controlling stakeholder’s behavior and protecting the interest of investors.Under the Chinese especial institutional background,this paper empirically test the impact of negative media coverage on controlling shareholders tunneling with the sample of 2010- 2011 non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen.The empirical results demonstrate that negative media coverage can reduce controlling shareholders tunneling,and compared with stateowned listed companies,non-state owned listed companies are more likely to reduce the controlling shareholders tunneling behavior when there’s negative media coverage.The research results are not only conducive to have a deeper understanding of media’s role in corporate governance,but also helpful to promote the perfection of corporate governance of Chinese listed companies and protect the interest of investors.
negative media coverage controlling stakeholder tunneling investor protection
Li Ming Ye Yong Wang Yixuan
School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, China,610031
国际会议
大连
英文
185-190
2014-06-30（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）