Strategy-Proof Auction Mechanism with Group Price for Virtual Machine Allocation in Clouds

摘要：

　　Market mechanism constitutes an efficient scheme for the allocation of cloud-based computing resources with the view of virtual machines.However,most of the existing mechanisms commonly use fixed price model and ignore flexible price model for the cloud providers.In this paper,we formulate the problem of virtual machine allocation in clouds as a combinatorial auction problem and propose a mechanism with group price to solve it,in which the cloud provider can express the discount price for each kind of traded virtual machine instances.We investigate the theoretical properties of the proposed mechanism including individual rationality,ex-post budget balance,and truthfulness.Extensive simulation results show that the proposed mechanism yields the allocation efficiency and computational tractability while generating higher revenue for the cloud providers than the mechanism with fixed price.

关键词： Cloud Computing Strategy-proof Mechanism Group Price Virtual Machine Allocation Greedy Heuristic

作者: Yonglong Zhang Bin Li Zhiqiu Huang Jin Wang Junwu Zhu Huanfeng Peng

作者单位: School of computer science and technology,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing School of Information Engineering,Yangzhou University,Yangzhou,China;State Key Laboratory for Novel School of computer science and technology,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing School of Information Engineering,Yangzhou University,Yangzhou,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2014 2nd International Conference on Advanced Cloud and Big Data (CBD 2014)(2014年先进云计算和大数据国际会议)

会议地点: 安徽黄山

会议语种:英文

页码: 60-68

在线出版日期: 2014-11-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）