Convergence of Potential Networked Evolutionary Games

摘要：

　　This paper considers when a potential networked evolutionary game(NEG)converges to a Nash equilibrium.First,based on the fundamental evolutionary equation,the prole dynamics of an NEG is revealed.Then we show that an NEG is potential,if the fundamental network game is.Finally,a sufficient condition for an NEG to converge to a Nash equilibrium is presented.An illustrative example is included to demonstrate the theoretical and numerical results.

关键词： Networked evolutionary game potential myopic best response adjustment rule (MBRAR) Nash equilibrium semi-tensor product of matrices

作者: Yuanhua Wang Ting Liu Daizhan Cheng

作者单位: Institute of Control Science and Engineering,Shandong University,Jinan,250061,P.R.China Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,P.R.China Institute of Control Science and Engineering,Shandong University,Jinan,250061,P.R.China;Academy of M

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第26届中国控制与决策会议(2014 CCDC)

会议地点: 长沙

会议语种:英文

页码: 3749-3754

在线出版日期: 2014-05-31（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）