An Evolutionary Game Approach to Analyzing Bid Evaluation Behaviors for Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction
Bid evaluation mechanism is a key factor to the fairness of auction and resource allocation. The current bid evaluation process is usually done by two groups, business expert group and technical expert group, separately. Taking bounded rationality as precondition, it will induce the antagonistic feelings and non-cooperation behavior between two groups. This paper focus on bid evaluation behaviors of referee experts. Firstly, the bid evaluation process and existent problems within the mechanism are described, and a non-cooperative static game model about grouped bid evaluation behaviors is constructed to analyze the conditions how to achieve long-term cooperative equilibrium of two groups, and which is the Pure Strategies Nash Equilibrium. Then, the evolution paths and influencing factors of bid evaluation behaviors are analyzed with the idea of evolutionary game. We also disclose the effect of individuals choice of policy on group behaviors. The method of this paper can offer decision support for administrative department of bid evaluation, so that they can take the best management practices and guide the referee experts behaviors evolving to the expectative direction, to improve the fairness of bidding evaluation.
Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Behavior Operation Management Grouped Bid Evaluation Evolutionary Game Behavioral Analysis
LIU Xuwang QI Wei WANG Dingwei
School of Business Administration, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004, China School of Business Administration, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004, China;Institute of Systems Engi Institute of Systems Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
国际会议
长沙
英文
5358-5363
2014-05-31（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）