Nash Equilibrium Flow in a Routing Game with Random Queues
In this paper,we present a new dynamic flow routing model on networks of parallel paths with capacities on edges and a regime of random queues at vertices.According to the introduced rules of waiting at vertices,we estimate the routing cost functions expressed by a mathematical expectation of a routing duration.For the corresponding routing game with nonatomic agents we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium flows and provide a method for their computation.On a basis of the investigated properties of cost functions and Nash equilibrium flows,we show that the routing costs can be changed in such a way that one of the resulting equilibrium flows minimizes with some accuracy the time a network is used by agents.
Dynamic Routing Capacitated Network Random Queues Nash equilibrium flow Price Design
Tatiana Tatarenko Ivan Popov
Department of Control Theory and Robotics,TU Darmstadt,Darmstadt 64289,Germany
国际会议
长沙
英文
1729-1734
2014-05-31（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）