Research on Supply Chain Internal Financing of Small and Micro Businesses with Signaling Game under Moral Hazard

摘要：

　　In this paper, contracts are designed through levels of initial capital and monitoring to signal the small and micro businesses repayment ability.We get conditions under which the small and micro businesses obtain financial support, and we find the relations between conditions and initial capital, levels of supervision, reserved profit.Studies have shown that the small and micro businesses can obtain financing if its initial capital had reached a certain amount, the initial capital level is positively correlated with manufacturers reserved profit and private gain under moral hazard.However, the initial capital level is negatively correlated with the rate of return on investment.If the small and micro businesses cant achieve this level of initial, the application of manufacturers supervision would reduce the requirements of initial capital.

关键词： moral hazard signaling game initial capital monitoring small and micro businesses supply chain internal financing

作者: Wang Pingping Guo Hongmei Jiang Qiang

作者单位: Business school, Sichuan University, Chengdu, P.R.China, 610064

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2013 International Conference on Strategic Management(2013年战略管理国际会议)

会议地点: 成都

会议语种:英文

页码: 610-617

在线出版日期: 2013-12-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）