Segregation and the Evolution of Cooperation

摘要：

　　Thirty years have passed since Robert Axelrod and William Hamilton published their influential contribution to the problem of cooperation.They showed, with the help of both an experiment and analytical techniques, that cooperation is the most likely evolutionary outcome of a Prisoners Dilemma game when individuals interact repeatedly.Building on Hamiltons earlier work they also demonstrated that, when pairing of individual is not completely random,cooperating behavior can evolve in a world initially dominated by defectors.In this paper, Computer simulations are used to study the relation between nonrandom pairing and the maintenance of cooperative behavior under evolutionary dynamics.We conclude that cooperation can survive also when the possibility of repeated interaction and reciprocity is ruled out.

关键词： Segregated interaction Cooperation Evolution

作者: Noureddine Bouhmala Jon Reiersen

作者单位: Department of Computer Science, Vestfold University College,Raveien 215, 3184 Borre, Norway Department of Business and Management, Vestfold University College,Raveien 215,3184 Borre,Norway

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Seventh International Conference on Intelligent System and Knowledge Engineering, ISKE 2012/The 1st International Conference on Cognitive System and Information Processing, CSIP 2012(第七届智能系统与知识工程国际会议/第一届认知系统与信息处理国际会议)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 127-138

在线出版日期: 2012-12-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）