On Convergence of Evolutionary Games

摘要：

　　The set of finite games with fixed numbers of players and strategies for every player becomes a vector space.Certain equivalences are introduced to classify the elements in the vector space of finite games.Then the subspace of(exact or weighted)potential games are calculated.For the evolutionary(finite)games,certain strategy updating rules are investigated,which lead to certain profile dynamics consisting with the equivalence.The convergence to(pure)Nash equilibriums is investigated.Finally,the projection of finite games to the subspace of potential games is considered,and a simple formula is given to calculate the projection.The dynamics between a game and its projection is compared,which produces a method to verify the convergence of an evolutionary game to a Nash equilibrium or an ε-equilibrium.

关键词： Potential game evolutionary game sequential or cascading myopic best response adjustment rule Nash equilibrium convergence

作者: Daizhan Cheng Hongsheng Qi Yuanhua Wang Ting Liu

作者单位: Institute of Control Science and Engineering,Shandong University,Jinan 250061,P.R.China;Key Laborat Key Laboratory of Systems and Control,Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science,Chinese Academy of Institute of Control Science and Engineering,Shandong University,Jinan 250061,P.R.China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 33th Chinese Control Conference第33届中国控制会议

会议地点: 南京

会议语种:英文

页码: 5539-5545

在线出版日期: 2014-07-28（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）