Solving Potential Games with Unstable Dynamics
We solve N-player potential games with possibly unstable dynamics in this paper.Different from most of the existing Nash seeking methods,we provide a method based on an extremum seeking scheme that does not require the information on the game dynamics or the payoff functions.Only measurements of the payoff functions are needed in the game strategy synthesis.Compared with other Nash equilibrium seeking methods based on extremum seeking which are model free as well,we dont need the dynamics of the potential games to be stable.The game dynamics can even be non-autonomous.Lie bracket approximation is used for the analysis of the proposed scheme and a semi-globally practically uniformly ultimately bounded result is given.Stability of the closed loop system is verified and the ultimate bound is quantified.A numerical example is presented to validate the proposed method.The main contribution of the paper is that the proposed method can achieve stabilization and Nash equilibrium seeking for potential games with non-autonomous dynamics that may be unstable while no explicit model information is required.
potential games unstable dynamics extremum seeking
Maojiao Ye Guoqiang Hu
School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering,Nanyang Technological University,Singapore 639798
国际会议
The 33th Chinese Control Conference第33届中国控制会议
南京
英文
8182-8187
2014-07-28（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）