An Analysis of Principal-Agent Relationship Under the Engineering Supervision Institution

摘要：

　　The author establishes a principal-agent model which takes the scale of owners investment,the qualities of engineering supervision,the effects of exogenous random variables and some other factors into consideration.Then the author analyzes the influence of all the factors above on incentive intensity coefficient,and conducts an extensive research on the principal-agent relationship between the owner and the engineering supervision.At last,the author puts forward some key factors which must be considered in designing an incentive mechanism of engineering supervision.

作者: YUGUI CAO CHAOLAN XIAO XIAOCHUN LIU

作者单位: Department of Economics and Management,North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power,450000 Zhengzhou,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2014 International Conference on Management and Engineering(CME 2014)(2014管理与工程国际会议)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-7

在线出版日期: 2014-05-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）