Private Property Rights,Government Reputation,and Investment:Empirical Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in China

摘要：

　　The right to private property was fast written into the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China in March 2004.This paper uses a difference-in-differences approach to determine whether the reputation of the Chinese government could assure Chinese people that the stipulations on private property rights would be properly enforced.Employing the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database from 2000 to 2007 to implement the analysis, we find that domestic private enterprises have responded to the 2004 amendment by increasing their investment; the treatment effect becomes greater with the time going; and the treatment effect is greater for total fixed assets investment than for total assets investment.All three findings suggest that Chinese people believe that the Chinese government would properly enforce the stipulations on private property rights.We address four potential concerto about our empirical design.

关键词： Private Property Rights Government Reputation Investment China

作者: AN Zhiyong

作者单位: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 1st Chinese Conference on Comparative Political Economy (第一届比较政治经济学国际学术会议)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 186-200

在线出版日期: 2013-09-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）