The Effects of Political Institutions in China:Evidence from the Mandatory Retirement Age
This study takes advantage of a natural experiment to show how changes in political institutions shape economic outcomes in China.Beijing introduced the mandatory retirement age for provincial leaders in the 1980s, but the rule was not enforced across all provinces until 2000.I use this window to construct a difference-in-differences design and show how mandatory retirement rule leads to better economic outcomes.Provincial leaders eligible for promotion are now motivated to perform better on growth and social welfare provision in order to succeed under the performance-based promotion system.But this institution is not perfect, as it results in poorer performances among lame-duck leaders near the retirement age.I also fred that leaders with central connection tend to have worse performances.This suggests that when politicians have connection with the center, they hold the key to promotion already, so they do not need to worry about the Chinese-style yardstick competition.
China mandatory retirement growth social welfare provision institution
Derek LIU
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
国际会议
The 1st Chinese Conference on Comparative Political Economy (第一届比较政治经济学国际学术会议)
北京
英文
201-231
2013-09-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）