Loyalty versus Competence:Internal Conflicts and the Pattern of Bureaucratic Control in China,1644-1911
The quality of state bureaucrats is often key for maintaining social stability.This paper analyzes how Chinese rulers in the Qing dynasty controlled provincial governors and used sanctions and appointments as a mechanism.I argue that the rulers faced a trade-off between competence and loyalty.The ethnicity-based patronage favoring Manchus consolidated the power within the central government, yet the bureaucrats of the majority group, Hans, were important for the stability at the local level I find that the probability of provincial governors being sanctioned increased, while the probability of promotion decreased significantly following internal conflicts.Moreover, the rulers tended to appoint Hans when the society was exposed to a high risk of conflict.This is consistent with the rise in the ratio of Han governors during the nineteenth century, when the Qing rulers were embroiled in mass rebellions and suffering from the decline in state capacity.
Sovereign Default Regime Type Regime Duration Globalitzation Bayesian Multilevel Model
XI Tianyang
Peking University
国际会议
The 1st Chinese Conference on Comparative Political Economy (第一届比较政治经济学国际学术会议)
北京
英文
471-505
2013-09-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）