COMMUNICATION LEADING TO COALITION NASH EQUILIBRIUM II - S4N-KNOWLEDGE CASE -
In this paper the new concept of coalition Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is introduced,and it is shown that a communication among the players in a coalition leads to the equilibrium through messages.A coalition Nash equilibrium for a strategic game consists of (1) a subset S of players,(2) independent mixed strategies for each member of S,(3) the conjecture of the actions for the other players not in S with the condition that each member of S maximises his/her expected payoff according to the product of all mixed strategies for S and the other players’ conjecture.However,this paper stands on the Bayesian point of view as follows: The players start with the same prior distribution on a state-space.In addition they have private information which is given by a reflexive and transitive binary relation on the state space.Each player in a coalition S predicts the other players’ actions as the posterior of the others’ actions given his/her information.He/she communicates privately their beliefs about the other players’ actions through messages among all members in S according to the communication network in S,which message is information about his/her individual conjecture about the others’ actions.The recipients update their belief by the messages.Precisely,at every stage each player communicates privately not only his/her belief about the others’ actions but also his/her rationality as messages according to a protocol and then the recipient updates their private information and revises her/his prediction.In this circumstance,we show that the conjectures of the players in a coalition S regarding the future beliefs converge in the long run communication,which lead to a coalition Nash equilibrium for the strategic game.
Communication Conjecture Knowledge revision Message Coalition Nash equilibrium Protocol S4-knowledge model
Takashi Matsuhisa
Department of Natural Science, Ibaraki National College of TechnologyNakane 866, Hitachinaka-shi, Ibaraki 312-8508, Japan
国际会议
11th International Symposium on Operations Research and its Applications(第11届运筹学及其应用国际研讨会)
安徽黄山
英文
51-57
2013-08-23（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）