DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF A MAINTENANCE SERVICE CONTRACT

摘要：

　　This paper studies a novel maintenance model with service contracts.We use a non-cooperative game formulation in which both parties,agent and unit owner,take the decisions by maximizing their expected profits to determine the agent’s optimal pricing strategy,the length of warranty and the number of repairmen for a monopolist service agent providing the maintenance service.We find that the optimal length of warranty and the number of repairmen are independent of the warranty price functions.Furthermore,for fixed lifetime of the unit,the number of customers hardly affects the optimal length of warranty.

关键词： Service contract queueing system game theory reliability optimization

作者: Zhaotong Lian Jinbiao Wu

作者单位: Faculty of Business Administration, University of Macau, Macau SAR, China Faculty of Business Administration, University of Macau, Macau SAR, China;School of Mathematics and

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 11th International Symposium on Operations Research and its Applications(第11届运筹学及其应用国际研讨会)

会议地点: 安徽黄山

会议语种:英文

页码: 114-119

在线出版日期: 2013-08-23（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）