EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES IN AN M/M/1 QUEUE WITH SETUP TIMES AND A SINGLE VACATION POLICY
We consider equilibrium strategies in an Markovian queue with setup times and a single vacation policy.Arriving customers decide either to enter the system or to balk based on their desire for service and their unwillingness for waiting.We derive equilibrium strategies for both cases of fully observable queue and fully unobservable queue.Then,for fully unobservable queue,we consider socially optimal strategy and illustrate the effects of several parameters on equilibrium strategy and socially optimal balking strategy using numerical examples.
Queueing systems single vacation setup times balking equilibrium strategies
Dequan Yue Ruiling Tian Wuyi Yue Yaling Qin
College of Sciences, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China Department of Intelligence and Informatics, Konan University, Kobe 658-8501, Japan College of Liren, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China
国际会议
11th International Symposium on Operations Research and its Applications(第11届运筹学及其应用国际研讨会)
安徽黄山
英文
159-164
2013-08-23(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)