Bankers on the boardroom and Firm Performance in China
Board connections between banks and potential borrowers are important issues,yet to be investigated in emerging economies.Utilizing a novel dataset of banker presence on the boardroom in Chinese listed firms,we find that distressed firms are more likely to appoint commercial bankers onto the boardroom.The stock market reacts negatively towards the appointments of banker in the boardroom and the operating performance of the firms with bank directors tends to deteriorate over time.We show that the presence of banker on the board can increase firms access to bank loans and reduce investment cash flow sensitivity.However,we also find that related party transactions and managers compensation are significantly higher,and that pay-to-performance sensitivity is substantially lower,in firms appointing banker directors.
Bankers Board of directors Corporate governance Firm value
Qing He Chenqi Zhu
School of Finance & China Financial Policy Research Center,Renmin University of China Department of Economics,the Chinese University of Hong Kong
国际会议
2013 China Finance Review International Conference(第六届(2013)中国金融评论国际研讨会)
上海
英文
1-41
2013-07-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）