IS BLOOD THICKER THAN SOCIAL CAPITAL?-FAMILY CONTROL AND VERTICAL INTERLOCKS IN CHINESE BUSINESS GROUPS
We investigate risk of appropriation of minority shareholders in listed firms affiliated with family owned business groups (pyramids).We investigate whether such risks are greater for family pyramids than for state owned ditto.We furthermore examine how a) family ties between listed firm chairmen and business group owners and b) vertical managerial interlocks between listed and apex firm affect risk of appropriation.We also investigate the moderating effects of institutional development on these two different types of managerial ties.We find that both state control and vertical interlocks tend to reduce risk of appropriation.Further,our results show that family managerial ties do not affect appropriation risk directly,but do influence the effect of vertical interlocks,in that vertical interlocks have a negative and significant impact on related guarantee only for firms with non-family chairman.In addition,we find that the effect of both vertical interlocks and family ties are moderated by institutional development.
Business groups family businesses corporate governance agency theory social capital
Jakob Arnoldi Xin Chen Chaohong Na
Aarhus University Shanghai Jiao Tong University Yunnan University of Finance and Economics
国际会议
2013 China Finance Review International Conference(第六届(2013)中国金融评论国际研讨会)
上海
英文
97-130
2013-07-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）