Does Prospective Physicians Behavior Depend on Payment Systems? Results from a Laboratory Experiment Applying a Within-Subject-Design
In China, there is a lively debate about which health care system to introduce. The issue also involves how physicians should be paid to treat their patients optimally. We run a controlled laboratory experiment based on Hennig-Schmidt, Selten, and Wiesen (Journal of Health Economics, 2011) to contribute to this agenda. We analyze the influence of incentives from the most widely spread remuneration systems fee-for-service(FFS) and capitation (CAP) on physicians supply of medical services.In our experiment, Chinese medical students act in the role of physicians. They choose quantities of medical services for patients with different states of health. We find that physicians provide significantly more services under FFS than under CAP, a tendency that corresponds to theoretical results and experimental findings in Germany and Canada. Moreover, the patient benefit deviates significantly from the patient optimumunder both payment systems even though students do not maximize their profits.
Wang Jian GeirGodager Heike Hennig-Schmidt
Shandong University
国际会议
The 8th Conference on Industrial Economics and Economic Theory(第八届产业经济学与经济理论国际研讨会)(IEET08)
济南
英文
81-81
2013-06-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）