On Optimal Social Convention in Voluntary Continuation Prisoners Dilemma Games

摘要：

　　When the repeated prisoners dilemma setup is generalized to allow for a unilateral brcakup,maximal efficiency in equilibrium remains an open question. With restrictions of simple symmetry with eternal mutual cooperation, defection, or (matched) altcrnation on the equilibrium path, we describe the upper limit of discounted lifetime payoff and construct simple social conventions that, for a large set of parameters, achieve it. While all othcr well known equilibrium designs in the literature punish defections with a breakup and thus reach the optimum only in degenerate cases, exploited cooperators in ours allow defectors to compensate them by cooperating more in the future.

关键词： voluntary continuation repeated prisoners dilemma social convention moral maxim finite automaton eternal cooperation eternal alternation

作者: Filip Vescly Chun-Lei Yang

作者单位: Department of Economics,University of Wisconsin Milwaukcc RCHSS,Academia Sinica

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 8th Conference on Industrial Economics and Economic Theory(第八届产业经济学与经济理论国际研讨会)(IEET08)

会议地点: 济南

会议语种:英文

页码: 161-190

在线出版日期: 2013-06-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）