Game Study on Collusion in the First-price Sealed-bid Reverse Auction

摘要：

　　Collusion between suppliers in reverse auctions may damage buyers benefits and then lower efficiency of resource allocation.Under first-price sealed-bid reverse auction mechanism,suppliers equilibrium bidding strategy and buyers revenue loss was analyzed considering collusion.Then some general conclusions were given:suppliers bidding strategy is relevant to some factors such as valuation costs,the number of suppliers and Cartel;the number of suppliers and Carter can lead to buyers revenue loss.Finally,considering two different kinds of distribution function,the strategies of improving buyers revenue were discressed.

关键词： reverse auction collusion equilibrium bidding

作者: Tian Jian Xu Xinxin

作者单位: School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Twelfth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business(第十二届武汉电子商务国际会议)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 505-512

在线出版日期: 2013-05-25（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）