Analysis on the Incompleteness of Moral Hazard Model

摘要：

　　Moral hazard model is an important model in contract design.Starting from the result set of the moral hazard contract,this paper analyzes the incompleteness of moral hazard contract which is with great practical significance.Our results show that if the contracting parties cant reach a consensus on the possible outcomes of the future (i.e.the result set of contract),some efficiency contract (or agreement) may not be realized.

关键词： contract moral hazard model incompleteness

作者: Yifang Tang Aihe Wang Yan Li Yumei Hu

作者单位: Institute of systems engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2nd International Conference on Advanced Materials and Engineering Materials(第二届先进材料与工程材料国际会议)(ICAMEM2012)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 733-736

在线出版日期: 2012-12-16（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）