Pollution regulation policy for SMEs under centralized pollution control
A tripartite game model of pollution control regulation among govemment,Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and pollution control enterprises under centralized pollution control was established and the optimal pollution discharge regulation policy was found and the main factors such as discharge coefficient and unit social cost of pollutant that influence the optimal policy were analyzed.It is shown that the government would reduce the discharge indicators of SMEs with the increase of discharge coefficient and unit social cost of pollutant and the pollution control enterprises would improve their pollution control prices; profits of SMEs with increased discharge coefficient would also be reduced and at the same time the profits of other SMEs would be increased.
centralized pollution control Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) pollution discharge regulation pollution control price
H.Y.Nie B.Huang Y.Y.Li
Science and Technology Enterprise Group of Chongqing University, Chongqing, China College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China College of Computer and Information Science, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing, China
国际会议
香港
英文
106-109
2012-12-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）