Stability of Evolutionary Equilibrium of Incentives for Teachers under Incomplete Information

摘要：

　　Higher education institution is chose as studying object to examine the incentive issue of teachers,which is of great theoretical and practical significance for the development of managing model for human resource for inspiring the latent of teacher.The asymmetric evolutionary game between higher education institution and teacher is studied based on imperfect information and the dynamic evolutionary equilibrium is also derived.Some cases are discussed in this paper and cooperation will be optimal selection if both sides will re-adjustment the distribution of benefits and this process of cooperation is an evolutionary process.

关键词： Incentive mechanism incomplete information evolutionary equilibrium stability analysis

作者: Lu SHI

作者单位: School of Stomatology, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou, China, 450000 ;Fourth Affiliated Hospital, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou, China, 450000

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: the 2011 International Conference on Frontiers of Manufacturing Science and Measuring Technology (第一届制造科学与检测技术国际会议(ICFMM2011))

会议地点: 重庆

会议语种:英文

页码: 496-500

在线出版日期: 2011-06-23（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）