Object Defense Strategy With Imperfect False Targets and Disinformation
This paper considers defending a single object with imperfect false targets and disinformation actions.Existing papers have assumed that the false targets are either perfect or with a constant detection probability.In practice,intelligent attacker may allocate part of its budget into detecting the false targets.Analogously,the defender can allocate part of its budget into disinformation actions in order to prevent the false targets from being detected.In this paper,the detection probability of each false target is assumed to be a function of the intelligence and disinformation efforts allocated on the false target.The optimal resource allocation between target identification/disinformation and attack/protection efforts is studied for the case of constrained defense and attack resources.
reliability vulnerability defense attack false targets contest success function
Rui Peng Wenbin Wang Fei Zhao
Dongling School of Economics and Management University of Science and Technology Beijing Beijing, China
国际会议
成都
英文
64-67
2012-06-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）