Analysis of Incentive Strategies of Ordnance Material Supplier Direct Delivery Based on Stackelberg Model

摘要：

　　The just-in-time (JIT) delivery is the most important aim of ordnance material supplier direct delivery support (SDDS).However,different profit targets determine the leaderfollower game relationship between ordnance material support organization and supplier.Therefore,the objective compatible incentive strategy to supplier should be adopted to improve the capability of JIT delivery.On the premise of uncertainty of demand,the optimal incentive strategy to supplier is obtained by the Stackelberg model of ordnance material supplier direct delivery incentive.First,the model analyzes the necessary condition of the existence of optimum delivery time and incentive.Then,the model further interprets the relationship between correlative parameters and optimal solution.In conclusion,the incentive to supplier can improve the capability of JIT delivery,but the different optimum incentive strategies should be carried out by the relative parameters.

关键词： ordnance material supplier direct delivery support(SDDS) incentive strategy Stackelberg model just-intime( JIT) delivery

作者: Tielu Gao Qi Gao Zhaoxie Huang Shuqing Ye

作者单位: Department of Engineering Management Shijiazhuang Mechanical Engineering College Shijiazhuang 050003 Unit 73132 PLA Zhangzhou, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2012 International Conference on Quality, Reliability, Risk, Maintenance, and Safety Engineering & The 3rd International Conference on Maintenance Engineering (2012质量,可靠性,风险,维修性及安全性工程国际会议(QR2MSE 2012 & ICME 2012))

会议地点: 成都

会议语种:英文

页码: 1330-1334

在线出版日期: 2012-06-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）