The Price Strategy for Manufacturer-driven Closed-loop Supply Chain Under the Governmental Incentives
This paper studies the price strategy of two-echelon manufacturer-driven closed-loop supply chain under the governmental incentives. The Stackelberg game model in which the manufacturer acts as the leader while the retail plays as the follower is constructed. Finally a numerical example is presented to verify the theoretical modeling and solving. Some conclusions are drawn from the numerical analysis: firstly, as the improvement of the governmental incentives, the collection rate of the retail increases until it is equal to 1; secondly, the parameters of price strategy such as wholesale price, retail price, collecting price and return price would change as the improvement of the governmental incentives. As a result, the profits of manufacturer and retailer will also change. The manufacturer can takes advantage of its dominant position to gain more benefits, while the retails profits would decrease after governmental incentives.
price strategy closed-loop supply chain incentive stackelberg game
Chen Xiaojuan Quan Chunguang Xu juan
Department of Industrial Engineering, Hunan University of Science and Technology, Xiangtan, China. 4 School of Enconomics and Management & School of Land Management.Huazhong Agricultural University ,Wu
国际会议
The 4th International Conference on Logistics and Supply China Management 2012(第四届物流工程与供应链管理国际研讨会)
长沙
英文
26-31
2012-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）