Game Analysis on rent-seeking behavior of managers
In the internal capital market, the system is not standard, supervision is not perfect, the manager of the departments often bribe senior managers, and cause the resources allocation distortion.According to the principal-agent theory, this article construct game model and get rentseeking optimal solution, and mainly analyze the relationship between the rent-seeking behavior and rent-seeking cost , punishment extent, the benefit and loss of the whole enterprise benefit and executive director, the cost of supervision and other related factors, and puts forward some constructive suggestions based on the above analysis.
principal agent theory rent-seeking double agents
PEI Hongling TAI Xiaohong
Graduate school,Liaoning technical university ,Huludao,China,125105 College of Business Administration, Liaoning technical university,Huludao, China,125105
国际会议
大连
英文
240-244
2012-07-07（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）