Local Government Intervention and the Implementation Effect of Special Treatment
The paper focuses on the implementation effect of special treatment in China. We argue that the promulgation of the special treatment as a provision in Chinese securities laws and regulations can trigger the opening of a market for corporate control which otherwise does not exist and improve the quality of the listed firms, while local government intervention weakens this function. The empirical evidence generally supports the prediction. It is found that ST firm’s control right transfer is generally efficient, while local government intervention decreases the odds of ST firm’s control right being transferred.
special treatment control right transfer local government intervention market for corporate control
ZHU Tao YANG Xiao
Institute & Department of Finance, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China, 510632 Cisco School of Informatics, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, China, 51006
国际会议
大连
英文
324-329
2012-07-07（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）