Market Discipline in Chinese Banking: A Survey

摘要：

We attempt to survey researches on market discipline, which utilizes market forces to constrain banks’ risk-taking behaviors as the third pillar of the New Basel Capital Accord, combined with the reality in China. Information disclosure and subordinated debt, as the two general instruments of market discipline, are focused on. Besides, whether the implicit deposit insurance can result in the failure of market discipline is explored. We reach the conclusion that owing to the existence of implicit deposit insurance and distempered laws, information disclosure and subordinated debt lose their effectiveness, and the constraints of market discipline are weak in Chinese banking.

关键词： Chinese banking market discipline information disclosure subordinated debt implicit deposit insurance

作者: MA Qingkui WANG Lei

作者单位: School of Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China, 116024

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 4th (2012) International Conference on Financial Risk and Corporate Finance Management(第四届(2012)金融风险与公司金融国际研讨会 FRCFM)

会议地点: 大连

会议语种:英文

页码: 339-343

在线出版日期: 2012-07-07（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）