Multiple Large Shareholders and the Investment Behavior of Listed Companies
With the research sample of Chinas 2008-2009 listed companies, this paper studies companies investment behavior under multiple large shareholders. Through empirical study, we found that companies overinvestment and underinvestment under multiple large shareholders are more serious compared with other ownership structure, and higher separating degree of control right and cash flow right would make overinvestment worse. The ownership balance can play an effective role in state-owned and other legal person controlled listed companies, but multiple large shareholders can make the companys investment worse in private listed companies.
multiple large shareholders overinvestment underinvestment
ZHANG Xu-hui YE Yong ZHANG Ying
School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, China, 610031
国际会议
大连
英文
350-356
2012-07-07(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)