Theoretical and Statistic Analysis on Necessary Bidder Numbers for Combinatorial Auctions
The reverse combinatorial auctions are widely applied to the centralized procurements and project tenders of governments and enterprise groups. To guarantee the competition of reverse auctions an enough number of bidders is necessary. Based on the computation method of winner combination numbers in literatures, we deduce the formulas to calculate the average feasible solution numbers in single time of bidding. Two theorems on the feasible solution numbers were proposed and proved. They show us the feasible solution numbers increase with the bidder number raise up, and decrease with object number grows up. The same problems of cases with bidding quota are discussed also. By means of proposed computing approach, the average feasible solution numbers of problems with different sizes are obtained. The results present the necessary bidder numbers to guarantee competition. To verify the correctness of proposed formulas, hypothesis testing method is used to a large number of simulated examples. The results support above conclusions. Above research works provide a theoretic foundation for organization and mechanism design of on-line reverse combinatorial auctions in centralized procurements.
Centralized e-Procurement Combinatorial auction Bidder number Auction mechanism design Hypothesis testing.
Dingwei Wang
School of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819,China
国际会议
The 24th Chinese Control and Decision Conference (第24届中国控制与决策学术年会 2012 CCDC)
太原
英文
2059-2064
2012-05-23（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）