An Empirical Study: the Performance of Control Transfer
This document aims to test whether control transfer can improve the performance of the company. By employing the method of paired-samples T test and independent-samples T test, this paper investigated the long-term (during 2001 to 2009) performance of corporate control in different measures of ROE, CROA and TQ, and yielded inconsistent conclusions. (1) After control-transfer, CROA increases obviously, and the improvement sustains. (2) After control-transfer, ROE increases in a short term, but the improvement does not sustain, which shows that ROE is whitewashed by controlling shareholder possibly. (3) Compensatory control-transfer is better than free control-transfer in measures of ROE and CROA improvement. (4) Partial control-transfer is better than entire control-transfer in measures of CROA, but it is not as good as ROE, which shows precisely that partial control-transfer is more conducive to the supervision and balance of shareholders controlling. (5) The nature of the new controlling shareholder does not make a difference in measures of ROE, CROA and TQ, which shows that the nature of the new controlling shareholder is not decisive in the conditions of security markets inefficiency. (6) TQ does not change much after control-transfer, neither in terms of the price or the degree of control-transfer, nor the nature of new controlling shareholder, which shows precisely that TQ obtained in alternative method lacks of authenticity and representation before all shares circulation.
Control-transfer Paired-Samples T Test Independent-Samples T Test
Junwei Wang
School of Accounting, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan, 250014, China School of Economics Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, China
国际会议
北京
英文
141-147
2012-05-19（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）