Research of Supervision and Incentive Mechanism to Engineer Based on the Information Asymmetry

摘要：

This paper started from the supervision and incentive mechanism on the basis of the theory, namely: information asymmetry theory, principal agent theory, the moral hazard theory and the ratchet effect theory, and analyzed the dominant supervision and incentive mechanism design and implicit incentive mechanism design that is how to Engineer, so as to maximize their utility, avoiding engineering accident.

关键词： supervision and incentive mechanism information asymmetry principal agent moral hazard ratcheting effect

作者: Daosheng WEI Maohua YANG

作者单位: School of Management Chongqing Jiao tong University Chongqing, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2012 International Conference on Electric Technology and Civil Engineering(2012 电子技术与土木工程国际会议 ICETCE 2012)

会议地点: 三峡

会议语种:英文

页码: 938-940

在线出版日期: 2012-05-18（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）