Cryptanalysis of Guo et al.s three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (G-3PAKE) protocol
In 2008, Guo et al.have shown that Lu and Caos simple three-party protocol for passwordauthenticated key exchanges (S-3PAKE) is indeed completely insecure against a kind of man-in-themiddle attack and the undetectable on-line password guessing attack.In addition, they have provided an improved protocol (G-3PAKE) that addresses the identified security problems. However, this paper demonstrates G-3PAKE protocol still falls to undetectable on-line password guessing attack by any other client.
Password-authenticated key exchange Cryptanalysis Three-party Security
Sung-Bae Choi Eun-Jun Yoon
Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information,Republic of Korea School of Computer Engineering,Kyungil University,Republic of Korea
国际会议
International Conference on Advances in Engineering 2011(2011年工程研究进展国际学术会议 ICAE2011)
南京
英文
187-191
2011-12-17(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)