Smart-strategys invasion of traditional evolutionarily stable strategy based on hawk and dove game
In traditional researches of evolutionary game theory, each individual takes a pure strategy or mixed strategy which are both a priori and fixed. Yet we find that smart-strategy, which is based on individuals memory and makes decision according to opponents historical actions information, makes the traditional evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) lose the original standard of evolutionary stability. Specially, we use some basic thoughts of subliminal channel for reference and then put forward some innovative viewpoints on how to design the smartstrategy. Through investigating the dynamic characteristics of the process that the smartstrategy invades ESS, we find when meeting certain parameters requirement, the smart-strategy can not only invade traditional ESS but also generate plenty of dynamic behaviors. That is proved by computer simulation experiments.
evolutionary game evolutionarily stable strategy strategy invasion evolutionary stability hawk and dove game smart-strategy
Dongwei Guo Mingguang Yu Chenhui Jia
College of Computer Science and Technology Jilin University Changchun, China
国际会议
杭州
英文
79-82
2011-08-26（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）