The Empirical Study on Institutional Investors Monitoring Controlling Shareholders
Under the circumstance of centralized shareholding, the principal contradiction for corporate governance is not that between shareholders and the management but that between major shareholders and minority shareholders. That is,the majority will take advantage of their special positions to invade the benefits of the minority. The attention paying to the Chinas situation that the controlling shareholders of listed companies invade the minoritys benefits by the means of grabbing Private Benefits of Control (PBC) is more worthwhile than that to countries which boast the more developed markets. With the accomplishment of Split Share Structure Reform, institutional investors play more and more important role in Chinas stock market. The essay focuses on whether institutional investors supervise listed companies and especially on whether the former monitor controlling shareholders. PBC is employed to measure the degree of the controlling shareholders invasion. The research statistics suggest that the more shares the institutions hold,the less PBC is. It also shows that situational investors hold shares and monitor the controlling shareholders in listed companies,which makes controlling shareholders control less private benefits. However,the result is not statistically significant; indicating that although institutional investors play a certain part in monitoring listed companies,and the former cant prevent controlling shareholders from hollowing out behavior obviously. Therefore,institutional investors monitoring controlling shareholders leaves much to be desired.
Institutional investors Controlling shareholders Active-monitoring
LI Jing TIAN Xinshi
School of Business, Foshan University, Foshan, Guangdong, China, 528000 School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, Hubei, China, 430074
国际会议
The Sixth International Symposium on Corporate Governance(第六届公司治理国际研讨会)
大连
英文
187-192
2011-08-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）