A Theoretical Study of Selections About Commercial Banks of Different Ownership to Small Businesses Credit

摘要：

The rational choice of commercial banks of different ownership is unequal in credit markets of small businesses. This paper though setting up evolution game model found that State-owned commercial bank is no matter competitive or uncompetitive,all of them generally choose to give up competition in the credit market of small business,non-state-owned banks compete with State-owned banks both in large firm credit market and small business credit market,and entry is rational selection of non-state-owned bank as same as consent is rational selection of stateowned bank in credit market of small businesses.

关键词： Different nature of ownership Commercial banks Small businesses credit, Evolutionary game

作者: QIN Jie ZHONG Tianli

作者单位: School of Economics & Management, Liaoning University of Petroleum and Chemical Technology, China, 1 School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, China, 110004

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Sixth International Symposium on Corporate Governance(第六届公司治理国际研讨会)

会议地点: 大连

会议语种:英文

页码: 727-734

在线出版日期: 2011-08-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）