Research on Supervision Mechanism of Government Information Service Outsourcing
The outsourcing of government information service constitutes an effective way to resolve the contradiction between demand and supply of government information. By means of constructing a evolutionary game model, we can come to conclusions that whether the government will choose to supervise the supplier is closely related to the supervision cost, penalty of malfeasance, fine for suppliers violation of regulations; besides, the suppliers choice to obey the regulations is also closely related to a host of factors such as the benefits from violating regulations; service cost, bonus and intangible benefits of obeying regulations; service cost, penalty and intangible loss of violating regulations; probability of violation being found. Altering the above parameters can exercise a great influence on the strategy choice by the two parties.
E-government govemment information outsourcing supervision mechanism Evolutionary game
Wang Hai-Jiao Wang Xin-Cai
School of Information Management Wuhan University Wuhan, P. R.China School of Information Management Wuhan University Wuhan, P. R .China
国际会议
哈尔滨
英文
1992-1996
2011-12-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）