Cryptanalysis of Authenticated Multiple Keys Exchange Protocol based on Bilinear Pairings
In 2010, Lee-Chen proposed an authenticated multiple keys exchange protocol based on bilinear pairings. Lee-Chen claimed that their proposed protocol not only is secure to a forgery attack, but also provides perfect forward secrecy. However, this paper points out that Lee-Chens protocol is still insecure to a forgery attack and cannot provide perfect forward secrecy.
Cryptography Authenticated key exchange Cryptanalysis Bilinear pairing Perfect forward secrecy Forgery attack
Eun-Jun Yoon Kee-Young Yoo
School of Computer Science and Engineering College of IT Engineering, Kyungpook National University Daegu 702-701, Republic of Korea
国际会议
西安
英文
321-325
2011-05-27(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)