Game Theory Anlaysis on Listed Company’s Credit Behavior

摘要：

The credit of the listed company has been a hot issue .In this paper, dynamic games of incomplete information was used to explain the credit problems of listed companies .using the KMRW reputation model, draw the following conclusions: As to the high information costs investors, they tend to uncooperative with the listed company with the condition of certain constraints and enough times of repeated game , while for the low information on the cost of investors, listed companies choose to comply with commitments, investors continue to invest, it is a perfect bayesian equilibrium.

关键词： listedcompaniescredit gameanalysis perfectBayesianequilibrium

作者: HOU Jie

作者单位: Business School of Hunan International economics University,Changsha,Hunan 410205,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information(2011商业管理与电子信息国际学术会议 BMEI2011)

会议地点: 广州

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-5

在线出版日期: 2011-05-13（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）